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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from Summary Judgment Motion partially granted in a
Memorandum Opinion issued by the Magistrate Court on October 8, 2015. R.pp.198205. The Magistrate ruled that Heinz All's Creditor's Claim against the jointly probated
estates of Robert Melton and Hedwig Melton was barred as against Hedwig Melton's
Estate pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-803(a)(l). Heinz Alt also challenged the timeliness
of the Estates' disallowance of his Creditor's Claim. The Magistrate Court ruled that the
disallowance of the Creditor's Claim by the Estate was timely. These two (2) issues were
appealed to the District Court.
On appeal to the District Court, Judge Stegner, reversed the Magistrate decision
granting the Estate's Summary Judgment as to Heinz Alt's Creditor's Claim against
Hedwig Melton's Estate and affirmed the Magistrate with regard to the ruling on the
timely disallowance of Mr. All's Creditor's Claim.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This case commenced with the filing of a Petition for Summary Administration of
Estate of Robert Melton ("Robert") on August 29, 2013, by Robert's wife of just three
years, Jadwiga Melton ("Jadwiga"). R. pp. l 0-18. Robert married Jadwiga in 2010 after his
first wife, Hedwig Melton's ("Hedy") death in 2008. R. pp. 10-18.
The Will submitted for probate by Jadwiga was not properly executed or selfauthenticating. R. pp. 12-17. All assets of the estate were community property of Robert
and Hedy acquired during the marriage. The Trial Court entered a decree vesting the estate
in Jadwiga on August 30, 2013. R. pp. 19-20.
I

Heinz Alt ("Heinz") is the son of Hedy and step son of Robert, raised by Robert
from a young age.

Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised

Administration and to Determine Testacy on September 6, 2013. R. pp. 21-38. Following a
hearing on October 15th, the Court set aside the Decree Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse.
R. pp. 39-40.

On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga, through new counsel, filed a Joint Petition for the
probate of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton's Estates. R. pp. 41-44.
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed his claim against the Estate for the sum of
$102,574.50. The verified claim sets forth a series of loans made to Robert and Hedy
Melton during their lifetime by Heinz for the purpose of acquiring the land and building a
home in Boundary County, Idaho, which is the primary asset identified in this Estate. R. pp.
45-54.
Following a contested hearing regarding authenticity of the 2010 Will submitted by
Jadwiga, the Court entered an Order for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of
Personal Representative on February 2, 2015. R. pp. 55-57.
On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to allow his claim. R. pp. 59-68.
On June 29, 2015, the Estate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on Heinz's
Creditor's Claim asserting a variety of issues. R. pp. 69-91.
On October 8, 2015, the Magistrate issued its Memorandum Opinion denying the
Estates' Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues except Heinz's Creditor's Claim
against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton. As part of these issues, the Court also ruled
on the timeliness of the Estates' disallowance of the Creditor's Clain1 that the claim was
timely disallowed under the Idaho Probate Code. R. pp. 198-205.
2

On December 3, 2015, the Magistrate entered a Judgment in accordance with the

Memorandum Opinion certifying the same under Rule 54(b). R. pp. 206-207.
Heinz filed a timely Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2016. R. pp. 208-210.
Heinz filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2016. R. pp. 216-218.
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court, acting in its appellate
capacity issued an Opinion on Appeal on November 30, 2016. R. pp. 317-334.
The District Court affirmed the Magistrate's Decision with regard to the Estates'
timely disallowance of the Creditor's Claim, but reversed the Magistrate's ruling that
Heinz's Creditor's Claim was barred under Idaho Code § 15-3-803 as against Hedy
Melton's Estate. R. pp. 317-334.
On January 10, 2017, Jadwiga filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's
decision. R. pp. 363-366.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts here are largely undisputed and are contained within the verified
Creditor's Claim filed by Heinz. Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and stepson of
Robert and was raised by Robert from a young age. Heinz loaned money to Hedy and
Robert for the purpose of enabling them to purchase land and build a log home on that
land in Boundary County, Idaho. The land and log home are the only substantial assets of
the Estates at the time of Hedy's and Robert's respective deaths. R. pp. 61-68.
The property was previously deeded to Heinz in recognition of the loan received
by Robert and Hedy. These Gift Deeds were attached and submitted in supported of the
Sununary Judgment and other proceedings by Affidavit of Mary Cusack. R. pp. 71-75.
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Subsequently, Robert and Hedy executed Wills leaving all of their estates to
Heinz following which Heinz deeded the Bonners Ferry property back to Hedy and
Robert. R. pp. 25-32; 369.
Hedy died August 11, 2008. No probate was filed. Less than two (2) years later,
Robert married Jadwiga, a woman significantly younger than Robert. Hedy and Robert's
1998 Wills left all assets (all of which were community) to the surviving spouse and then
to Heinz in the event of both deaths. R. pp. 25-32. The 1998 Wills were submitted for
probate after Robert's death by Heinz in a Motion to Convert Proceedings to a Summary
Administration. R. pp. 21-32.
On Robert's death, Jadwiga submitted a December 17, 2010, Will purportedly
executed by Robert just a few months after marrying Jadwiga. However, all of the assets
at the time of Robert's death were held as community property of Robert and Hedy. As
such, the Summary Administration procedure was improper and the Court entered an
Order setting aside the Decree Vesting the Estate to Surviving Spouse.
Following a contested hearing brought by Jadwiga to prove the proper execution
ofRobert's 2010 Will, Jadwiga was appointed as Personal Representative of the Estate in
a formal appointment proceeding of the joint estates of Robert and Hedy.
Thereafter, Jadwiga filed Summary Judgment on numerous issues, most of which
were denied. The Magistrate took under advisement the issue of whether Heinz's
Creditor's Claim was barred by the three (3) year limitations found in Idaho Code § 15-3803 as against Hedy's Estate. In a Memorandum Opinion, Judge Julian held that§ LC. §
15-3-803 barred the Creditor's Claim as against Hedy in the joint probate proceedings of
Robert and Hedy's Estates, but that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim against
4

Robert's Estate". R. pp. 198-205. The Magistrate issued a Judgment on December 3,
2015. R. pp. 206-207.
This appeal followed and tbe District Court reversed the Magistrate Judge in an
18-page Opinion on Appeal. R. pp. 368-385.
Jadwiga filed a Notice of appeal from the District Court's decision reversing the
Magistrate.
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II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

The District Court correctly construed the statutory language of LC. § 153-111 and LC.§ 15-3-803.

B.

Contrary to Appellant's Brief, the District Court did not err in its
consideration of legislative intent when construing Idaho Code § 15-3-111.

C.

The District Court properly applied rules of statutory construction when
construing LC.§ 15-3-111 and LC.§ 15-3-803.

D.

Jadwiga is not entitled to her costs and attorney's fees.

E.

Respondent is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs.

6

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In cases in which the Appellate Court is reviewing the decision of the District

Court sitting in its appellate capacity on a decision by the Magistrate's Court, the standard
of review is as follows:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate)
record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding of
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow
from those findings. If those findings are so supported and
the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affmn the district
court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,
859,303 P.3d214, 218 (2013)
However, as in this case where the District Court has reversed the Magistrate's
Decision, the same standard has been applied in cases in which the District Court has
reversed the Magistrate Court.
When reviewing the decision of the district court sitting in
its appellate capacity, our standard of review is the same as
expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate)
record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow
from those findings. If those fmdings are so supported, and
the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affmn the district
court's decision as a matter of procedure.
State v. Colvin, 157 Idaho 881,
882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (App.2014);
quoting Pelayo v. Pelayo, supra.
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"Thus, we do not review the magistrate court's decisions. Rather, we are
'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court"'. Bailey v.
Bailey. 153 Idaho 526,529,284 P.3d 970,973 (2012); quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413, 415n.1, 224P.3d480, 482n.1 (2009).
"This [C]ourt exercises free review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw ....
This Court also "exercises free review when interpreting the meaning of a statute". Doe
v. Doe, 162 Idaho 254, _ _, 395 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2017)
The District Court properly applied the Uniform Probate Code provisions in
reversing the Magistrate. This Court is asked to affirm the District Court's decision.

8

IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court correctly construed the statntory language of I.C. §
15-3-111 and LC. § 15-3-803.

Appellant's Brief argues that the District Court sitting in its appellate capacity
failed to analyze and apply the plain meaning of the statutory provisions ofldaho Code §
15-3-111 and Idaho Code§ 15-3-803 and that this failure was error as a matter oflaw
requiring reversal.
Appellant's Brief further argues that the language of the statute is "precise and
should be construed by its literal words". Appellant's Brief, p.13.
Appellant also argues that Idaho Code § 15-3-803 is unambiguous and clear in its
language and makes no reference to Idaho Code § 15-3-111 and, therefore, the extensions
of time for filing of probates found in subsection 111 should be disregarded and
subsection 803 read in isolation or without reference to the remaining portions of the
Probate Code.
Appellant's position is that the unambiguous language of LC. § 15-3-803 should
be read to prohibit all creditor's claims beyond the three (3) year of decedent's date of
death. Appellants' position requires application of section 803 while ignoring the
specific exceptions of section 111 that allow for filing a joint probate of husband and wife
where the assets are community property, but more than three (3) years have elapsed from
the date of death of the first spouse to die.
Appellant's legal authority for this premise is the case of Bonner County v.
Cunninghfill1, 156 Idaho 291,323, PJd 1252 (App., 2014). This case arises from a
search warrant and seizure of cash followed by a civil forfeiture action which was

9

untimely filed. The sole issue arising in Bonner County v. Cunningham was
Cunningham's entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
Appellant is correct that the Appellate Courts have consistently required that the
interpretation of a statute "begins with its literal word" and that "[t]hose words must be
given their plain, obvious and rational meaning". Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156
Idaho 291, 295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (App., 2014).
The decision in Bonner County v. Cunningham cites to Verska v. St. Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, a 2011 case in which the Idaho Supreme Court notes: "The
interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words
must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
as a whole'". Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893,

265 P.3d 502,506 (20ll) [emphasis added]; quoting In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho
565,567, 149 P.3d 840,842 (2006); also quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362,
79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003).
Appellant asserts that the District Court's opinion did not make a finding that the
statute was ambiguous when it chose to construe the statute using additional rules of
statutory construction and did not engage in its own analysis of the plain language of the
statute, the legislative history. Appellant's Brief, p.13
Both assertions are incorrect and misrepresent the District Court's opinion. The
latter assertion also misstates the law in Idaho as stated in Verska. The District Court is
not required to or should it analyze legislative history when an analysis of the plain
language of the statute, as a whole, leads to clear and unambiguous application of the law.
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The District Court, beginning at page 13 of its Opinion on Appeal, went through
extensive analysis of the statutory provisions contained within the Idaho Probate Code, as
follows:
The three year limitation for creditors in LC. § 15-3803(a)(l) parallels the general time limit for probating an
estate. LC.§ 15-3-108 states: "No formal probate or
appointment proceeding, or formal testacy or appointment
proceeding, .... may be commenced more than three years
after the decedent's death."
Although the general rule requires a probate action to be
commenced within three years of an individual's death,
there are two exceptions to the rule. First, pursuant to LC.
§ 15-3-1205, upon the death of a person leaving a surviving
spouse as a sole devisee or beneficiary, the surviving
spouse .... may file a petition for decree vesting the
property in the surviving spouse .... with the condition that
the surviving spouse (or person claiming entitlement
through the surviving spouse) assume and be liable for any
and all indebtedness that might be claimed against the
estate of the decedent.
Second, pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111, a joint probate may be
commenced to administer the estates of two deceased
spouses ...."
R. pp. 329-330
The District Court, in fact, spends three (3) pages analyzing the interplay between
subsection 803, 1205, 108 and 111, as well as discussing the history of the revisions or
additions to the Probate Code.
Additionally, the District Court addresses and discusses the legislative purpose set
forth in the 1995 amendment to subsection 111 before coming to the District Court's final
conclusion interpreting the probate code, as. follows:
A basic tenet of statutory construction is that the more
specific statute or section addressing an issue controls over
11

the statute that is more general. . . . . It is undisputed that
LC. § 15-3-111 extends the general three year time frame in
which to file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such
as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is the specific statute, while LC.
§ 15-3-108 and LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) are general statutes.
Because the three year provision of LC. § 15-3-108 only
applies to the death of the spouse whose death occuned
last, it would follow that the three year time frame set out in
LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) would also only apply to the death of
a spouse whose death occurred last in°probate actions filed
pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111.
Additionally, interpreting LC.§ 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring
creditors' claims against the "estate of the spouse whose
death occurred first" in probate actions commenced
pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111 simply because the death
occurred more than three years prior to the commencement
of the probate action would produce an absurd result. This
is because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of
both decedents [to] be joined for probate in a single
proceeding" within three years of the "death of the spouse
whose death occurred last". If the statute oflimitations for
the first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to
probate is that of the second to die. "Constructions of a
statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690,
85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004)
R. pp. 332-333
Despite Appellants arguments, the District Court did analyze the statute (probate
code) as a whole , and not just subsection 803 in isolation, as Appellant asserts should
have occurred.
This is consistent with Idaho law. "The objective of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to legislative intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,475, 163 P.3d 1183,
1187 (2007). "Such intent should be derived from a reading ofthe whole act at issue."
St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Brd. of Comm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755,
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). [emphasis added]
12

The District Court's opinion on appeal should be affinned by this Court.
B.

Contrary to Appellant's Brief, the District Court did not err in its
consideration of legislative intent when construing Idaho Code § 15-3111.

Appellant asserts that the District Court erred by not applying or interpreting
legislative intent from Idaho Code § 15-3-111 or by failing to consider the legislative
intent. Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-18.
First, Appellant's argument is incorrect and misstates the District Court's
Decision. Beginning at page 15 of the Opinion on Appeal, the District Court discussed at
length the legislative intent behind Idaho Code§ 15-3-111. R. pp. 382-384.
Furthennore, Appellant's position is incorrect with regard to the standards for
statutory interpretation as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court.
"'The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.'
'Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue."' Idaho Youth
Ranch, Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180,184,335 P.3d 25, 29
(2014); quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007); also
quoting St. Luke's Regional Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203
P.3d 683, 685 (2009).
As both the District Court Opinion and the Appellant's Brief aclmowledge, the
Court is required to interpret Idaho Code § 15-3-111 and§ 15-3-803(a)(l) as part of the
whole act at issue, the Idaho Unifonn Probate Code adopted in 1971. LC.§ 15-1-101.
Idaho Code § 15-1-103 requires that principles oflaw and equity are intended to
supplement the provisions of the Probate Code unless specifically "displaced" by
provisions of the Probate Code. LC.§ 15-1-103.
13

Appellant argues that subsection 111 was adopted in 1973 to "fill certain gaps left
out of the original Probate Code" and to allow estates of two (2) deceased spouses to be
joined for probate in a single proceeding even when the death of the first spouse is more
than three (3) years prior to the filing and would normally be prohibited under Idaho Code
§ 15-3-108. Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17.
Appellant argues that since no express reference is made to Idaho Code§ 15-3803, the legislative intent in adopting LC. § 15-3-111 does not include an intent to expand
time for creditor's claims beyond three (3) years from the date of death, even though that
subsection permits the filing of a joint probate more than three (3) years after the date of
death.
In this particular case, Hedy's death in 2008 would result in a bar to any creditor's
claim after August 11, 2011, if interpreted as Appellant argues. This absurd result would
require the filing of a probate of Hedy's Estate and a Creditor's Claim against that estate
by Heinz while Robert was still living.
Under Appellant's interpretation of subsection 111 and 803, Robert and Hedy's
Estates (and estates like them) may be excluded from the provisions of joint probates
underldaho Code § 15-3-111, based arbitrarily on whether the second spouse survives
more, or less, than three (3) years after the first spouse dies.
The District Court in its Opinion on Appeal noted the absurd result:
Additionally, interpreting LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l) as barring
creditors' claims against the "estate of the spouse whose
death occurred first" in probate actions commenced
pursuant to LC. § 15-3-111 simply because the death
occurred more than three years prior to the commencement
of the probate action would produce an absurd result. This
is because LC.§ 15-3-111 expressly allows "the estates of
14

both decedents [to] be joined for probate in a single
proceeding" within three years of the "death of the spouse
whose death occurred last". If the statute oflimitations for
the first to die is not tolled, then in effect the only estate to
probate is that of the second to die. "Constructions of a
statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh
results are disfavored" State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690,
85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004)
R. pp. 383-384
Contrary to Appellant's argument, the District Court properly construed the
legislative intent by analyzing and reading the whole act at issue (The Idaho Probate
Code) and reconciling Idaho Code§ 15-3-111 with Idaho Code§ 15-3-803 and related
provisions.
"Statutory interpretation begins with the 'literal word to the statute, and this
language should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning"'. Idaho Youth Ranch,
Inc. v. Ada County Board of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-5, 335 PJd 25, 29-30
(2014); quoting Seward v. Pacific Hyde and Fur Depot 138 Idaho 509,511, 65 P.3 531,
533 (2003).
Additionally, the District Court's ruling is consistent with the Probate Code's
purposes and rules of construction found at Idaho Code§ 15-1-102, which states that the
Code is to be "liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies". Those stated policies and purposes include simplifying and clarifying the law
concerning the affairs of decedents and should promote a speedy and efficient system for
liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors. LC. § 151-102 (2017).
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Appellant's argument would be counter to the purposes and rules of construction
set forth above, as it would require the filing of the probate upon the death of the first
spouse to die every time a creditor has a claim and the second spouse survives by three
(3) years or more. This is inconsistent with the purpose set forth above.
Likewise, the District Court's Opinion on Appeal is consistent with Idaho Code §
15-1-105 which provides that the Probate Code is a general act intended as a "unified
coverage of its subject matter and no part of it shall be deemed impliedly repealed by
subsequent legislation ifit can reasonably be avoided." I.C. § 15-1-1-5 (2017).
The District Court's Opinion on Appeal reconciles subsection 111 with subsection
803 so as not to nullify or void either provision in light of the other.
As the District Court noted, it is the obligation of the Court to interpret the statute
in a manner that would not lead to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result.
For these reasons, the District Court's decision should be affirmed as reversing
the Magistrate's Decision.
C.

The District Court properly applied rules of statutory construction
when construing I.C. § 15-3-111 and I.C. § 15-3-803.

In this section, the Appellant argues that the Court misapplied rules of

construction. As asserted above, the Respondent believes that the Court did not, in fact,
construe the statute, but simply applied the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 15-3-111 as an
exception to the general statutory requirement that all probates be filed within three (3)
years of the decedent's death. The Court then properly interpreted that Code section
along with Idaho Code § 15-3-803 in such a manner as to reconcile both statutory
provisions within the context of the whole Idaho Probate Code. This avoids an absurd
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result. As discussed above, the District Court's analysis was proper in light of the
directives on statutory interpretation set forth in prior case law and as set forth in the
provisions of the Probate Code itself.
Beginning at page 19 of her Brief, the Appellant argues that the District inserted
additional language into subsection 111, but at no point does the Appellant state what
additional language the District Court supposedly inserted into this subsection of the
probate code.
Perhaps some of the Appellant's confusion arises from her misreading ofldaho
Code§ 15-3-803. Appellant argues that this statutory provision imposes a "statute of
limitations" on submission of creditor's claims. In fact, subsection 803 states as follows:
(a)
All claims against a decedent's estate which arose
before the death of the decedent, including the claims of the
state and any subdivision thereof (except claims for state
taxes), .... if not barred earlier by another statute of
limitations or non-claims statute, are barred against the
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier
of the following dates: (1) three years after the decedent's
death ...
LC. § 15-3-803 (2017) 1
Keeping in mind the standard on summary judgments, there is a disputed fact as to
whether or not Heinz's Creditor's Claim was a claim which arose before the deaths of
Hedy and Robert. The verified claim indicates that Hedy and Robert were loaned money
by Heinz, which initially secured by conveying title to the property to Heinz followed by
execution of Wills which left the entirety of their estate to Heinz upon the second
1

Subsection 2 of the statute is inapplicable in this case and it is not quoted here because
of the language "the earlier of the following dates".
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spouse's death. In other words, the record before the Court would indicate that the claim
was not one which arose until after both Robert and Hedy had died, at which point the
Wills executed prior to Robert's marriage to Jadwiga would have left all of their estates
by bequest to Heinz as a means of repayment.
Further, when looking at the committee comments to section 803, it does not
appear, as Appellant argues, that 803 was intended as a "statute of limitations" for
creditors, so much as a means to expedite administration of estates.
"In 1989, the Joint Editorial Board recommended amendments to Subsection (a).

The change in (1) shortens the ultimate limitations period on claims against a decedent
from 3 years after death to 1 year after death. Corresponding amendments were
recommended for Sections 3-1003(a)(l) and 3.-1006. The new one-year from death
limitation (which applies without regard to whether or when an estate is opened for
administration) is designed to prevent concerns stemming from the possible applicability
to this Code of Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 485 U.S.
478 (1988) from unduly prolonging estate settlements and closings. Idaho Code§ 15-3803. Uniform Law Comments (2017)
Obviously, Idaho has adhered to the three (3) year limit on presentation of claims,
but the committee comments reflect a mindset that this code section is more about timely
administration and closing of estates, than barring creditor claims.
Regardless of the technical aspects of the summary judgment and whether a
disputed fact exists as to Heinz's claim and when it arose, the District Court properly
applied the rules of statutory construction in this case.
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A more logical reading of subsection of 803(a) is that the legislature intended that
upon the opening of an estate and appointment of a personal representative, the time
limits for "presentation" of a claim under 803 are triggered. The presumption under
Idaho Code§ 15-3-108 is that the estates will be opened within three (3) years of death
except for those estates which qualify for a joint probate under Idaho Code§ 15-3-111.
Upon opening of a joint probate under LC. § 15-3-111, as occurred in this instance,
"claims against the decedent's estates" which arose before the death of the decedent must
be "presented" within three (3) years after the decedents' death. Subsection 803 speaks in
terms of presenting claims within three (3) years of the "decedent's death". But, which
decedent's death triggers that three (3) year time limit in a joint probate under section
111?
For these reasons, the District Court properly applied the rules of interpretation
and did not "add words" to subsection 111. The District Court decision should be
affirmed.
In section C.2. of the Appellant's Brief, the Appellant argues that the District
Court misapplied the rule of construction that "general statute should not be interpreted as
encompassing an area already covered by one which is more specific". Marshall v.
Department of Transportation, 137 Idaho 337, 341, 48 P.3d 666,670 (App., 2002).
The District Court properly observed that subsection 111 is a more specific statute
within the probate code that provides an exception to the general rule that probate must
be filed within three (3) years of the decedent's death.
Appellant argues that subsections 803 and 111 are irreconcilable and the Court
should enforce that act which was passed later in time by the legislature. Appellant
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argues that since subsection 111 was last amended in 1997, whereas subsection 803 was
last admitted in 2004, that 803 should be read in isolation to overrule any provisions for a
later filing under the earlier passed statute in subsection 111. Appellant's Brief, p.24.
First, the two (2) statutory provisions are not irreconcilable as is demonstrated by
the District Court's Opinion.
The second rnle of interpretation advanced by the Appellant runs counter to long
established Idaho case law. "When considering the interpretation of a particular
provision ... the court should look in the surrounding provisions for proper context."
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468,476,283 P.3d
785, 793 (2012).
"Provisions should not be read in isolation but must be interpreted in the context
of the entire [statute]." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,866,264 P.3d 970,973 (2011);
citing Farber v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307,310,208 P.3d 289,292
(2009).
The District Court's ruling reversing the Magistrate should be affirmed and was a
proper application of the holding in Marshall v. Department of Transportation, that a
more general statute should not overrule a more specific statute. The Appellant's
arguments suggest that the Court is required to read each provision in isolation, and this is
contrary to established case law.
Lastly, the Appellant in section C.3 and C.4 revisits the arguments concerning
enforcement of the statutory creditor claim resulting in an absurd or unreasonably harsh
outcome. Without revisiting prior argument, it is unclear what Appellant's assertions are.
Beginning at pages 25 through 31 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant seems to simply restate
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the purposes ofldaho Code§ 15-3-111. ("A joint probate allows the estate of the second
· spouse to die to be probated and to finalize transfer of real property held in the name of
the first spouse to die." Appellant's Brief, p. 26).
Appellant's position from the beginning, seems to have been that this joint
probate was unnecessary on Appellant's theory that Robert acquired all right, title and
interest to the community estate when Hedy died.
Ms. Cusack: So this idea of filing in Robert's estate is
really, it doesn't matter because there is no claim.
Anything that he would have had ended three years after
Hedy's death. I don't see how we can-under the
community property statute. It does say that spouses can
bind the community property, that at her death that ended.
And then three years after her death there was no
opportunity, again, for Mr. Alt to say that there was any
more community property. Because it just became separate
property of Robert. So by - by waiting he lost his
opportunity to collect if there was one.
Tr. 8-24-2015, pp. 9-10.
The Magistrate Trial Court did not accept Appellant's legal theory, nor did the
District Court on appeal.
Court: I have - I am struggling with your assertion, and I
don't really know that it's particularly germane to the issue
I have to decide, but your assertion that essentially, and
correct me if I am misunderstanding it, at the instant Hedy
died there was no more community property, it all became
Robert's separate property. I don't know that I-that that
makes sense that the transfer would be uh- so automatic.
It seems to me that there is a community estate that would
move forward in time until it's terminated either by
operation of a three year statute of limitation or by a
probate decision.
Tr. 8/24/2015, p. 18, 11. 8-14
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The Appellant again argues in her Brief that the Heinz's Credi1Dr's Claim is
barred against Hedy's against and, therefore, barred in its entirety, once three (3) years
have lapsed following her death. She asserts that Heinz was required to file a probate of
Hedy's estate in order to assert his Creditor's Claim even thought that claim was a claim
against both Hedy and Robert or a community obligation. The Appellant further argues
that the operation of subsection 803 extinguishes the debt as against Hedy's estate and
by extension of the Appellant's logic, the community property of Robert and Hedy
miraculously became the separate property of Robert three (3) years following Hedy's
death or after August 11, 2011.
By this theory, the Appellant argues that Heinz's Creditor's Claim against Hedy's
estate is extinguished or time barred under subsection 803 and that because it was a
community obligation, but the community property without benefit of any probate
proceeding, became the separate property of Robert, Robert's estate is likewise free of
any creditor's claim.
This theory, while creative, is not supported by any fundamental principles in
either the Idaho Probate Code or community property law. Furthennore, it was a theory
rejected by both the Magistrate and the District Court in oral argument and in its
decision. The Magistrate's decision expressly provides that the claim may proceed
against Robert's estate.
This begs the practical question that overrides this case: If the Magistrate's
Decision is correct and Heinz's claim is barred three (3) years after Hedy's death, what
practical effect does that have on creditors in community property estates? The assets
are community assets of Robert and Hedy. If, as the Appellant argues, Hedy's interest in
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the property passed to Robert three (3) years after her death and became Robert's
separate property, it also passed subject to any debt owed by Hedy to Heinz. 2
This absurd result as advanced by the Appellant would mean that in every case in
which the marital community has a debt or obligation, the surviving spouse can
extinguish that obligation by simply waiting out the creditors until the survivor dies and
a joint probate is filed. For example, if husband and wife have a community credit card
or mortgage debt and the wife dies first, would the husband be permitted to extinguish
the balance on that debt by making minimum payments until his death then allowing his
executor to claim that the debt was extinguished because more than three (3) years have
lapsed since the wife's death?
This illustrates the absurdity of the Appellant's position throughout this
proceeding. The District Court correctly recognized this absurd result and his decision
should be upheld.
The District Court's decision should be affirmed and the matter remanded.
D.

Jadwiga is not entitled to her costs and attorney's fees.

Jadwiga asserts a right to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 15-8-208 and Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
First, the correct procedure for claiming attorney's fees and costs on appeal is
I.AR. 41, not IRCP 54.

"Bank also cites Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure. That rule does not provide any authority for awarding attorney fees." Capps v.
FIA Card Services, N.A., 240 P.3d 583,590, 149 Idaho 737, 744 (Idaho,2010)
2

For purposes of this discussion, Respondent assumes that Jadwiga wilt assert that
Robert was not obligated on the debt.
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Second, Jadwiga has not been a prevailing in this matter and should not, therefore,
be entitled to any costs or attorney's fees.
Third, Jadwiga asserts, under Idaho Code§ 15-8-208, that she is entitled to her
attorney's fees. LC. § 15-8-208 provides that either the District Court or the Court on
appeal may in its discretion order costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be
awarded to any party (a) from any party to the proceedings; (b) from the assets of the
estate or trust involved in the proceeding; or from any non-probate asset that is the subject
of the proceedings.
In addition to Appellant not being the prevailing party, the statutory provisions
cited are found in the Trust Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA). Idaho Code§ 15-8202 sets forth the procedure for commencing a judicial proceeding which might trigger
the provisions ofldaho Code § 15-8-208 and the award of attorney's fees. Subsection
202 requires a commencement of a "new action" or a "action incidental to an existing
judicial proceeding relating to the same trust or estate of non-probate asset".
This Court previously addressed that fees and costs may only be awarded under
this statutory provision where the "TEDRA were properly invoked" by the pleading, an
agreement, or a judicial action. Ouemadav. Arizmende., 288 P.3d 826,834, 153 Idaho
609, 617 (2012)
The record contains no indication that a Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
judicial proceeding was ever commenced under Idaho Code § 15-8-202 nor was TEDRA
invoked in the pleadings. Therefore, the attorney's fees provision found in I.C. § 15-8208 are inapplicable. Further, Appellant is not the prevailing party and is, therefore, not
entitled to attorney's fees and costs.
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E.

Respondent is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs.

Mr. Alt as the Respondent has been the prevailing party in this matter and is
entitled to fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code §12-121.
"It is well established that "[aJ party claiming attorney's fees must assert the

specific statute, rule, or case authority for its claim." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 117 P.3d 130, 134, 141 Idaho 716,720 (2005)
"But attorney fees are not awardable as a matter ofright. They should only be
awarded when the court believes "that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation." Idaho Military Historical Society, Inc.
v. Maslen, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080-81, 156 Idaho 624, 632-33 (2014)
Appellant's position was pursued, defended or brought frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation and Mr. Alt seeks an award of fees and costs on appeal.
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V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court is asked to affirm the District Court's

decision in the Opinion on Appeal dated November 29, 2016. This Court is further asked
to award the Respondent his attorney's fees and costs on appeal based upon Idaho Code §

12-121 and pursuant to the authority ofldaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.

d,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

_/j'_ day of July, 2017.

By.f,£.~~~~~=~=--BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
Attorney for Respondent
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